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In his “Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine 
of Religion,” Immanuel Kant considers and 
attempts to solve the problem of evil by 
combining many of the traditional theodicies.  
He focuses particularly on adherence to the 
moral law in order to work toward being worthy 
of happiness.  For Kant, the fact that happiness 
becomes a labor toward peacefulness becomes a 
sort of indicator of God’s goodness.  This 
strongly resembles John Hick’s “soul-making” 
theodicy.  Hick claims that humans must deal 
with evil in this world in order to become 
stronger and more suitable for a union with God 
in the afterlife.  In both cases, the problem of 
evil is apparently solved by emphasizing God’s 
goodness in encouraging the endurance of moral 
choices in humans through the burdens of the 
world.  In this paper, I will not only identify 
problems with the general “soul-making” 
theodicy, but also the inconsistency of Kant’s 
formulation with the rest of his philosophy. 
 In his attempt to reconcile God with the 
evil in the world, Kant concentrates his defense 
on the primacy of morality.  In fact, Kant thinks 
that these “considerations will settle the matter 
for us.”cxi  Through an examination of our free 
will and morality, he thinks evil will be placed 
in a proper light.  Kant claims that, as humans, 
we have the unique capability of choosing to act 
in accordance with the moral law.  Before Kant 
delves entirely into his notion of working 
toward happiness, he emphasizes our free will, 
which is the foundation on which our journey 
toward this worthiness to be happy rests.  
Furthermore, Kant points out that, “among the 
many creatures, the human being is the only one 
who has to work for perfections and for the 
goodness of his character, producing them from 












defense by showing that, not only are we unique 
in having the ability to make moral or immoral 
choices, but also that we are the only beings 
who must progress toward goodness through our 
free will.  Indeed, Kant maintains that “in this 
earthly world there is only progress.”cxii  An 
individual’s continual procession toward 
goodness and happiness is entirely dependent on 
his adherence to the moral law.  Moreover, we 
should strive toward goodness and happiness 
even though they are not “things to be 
possessed” in this world.cxiii 
 In solving the problem of evil, Kant 
develops God’s purpose in making the 
attainment of goodness and happiness so 
burdensome.  Kant poses the objection that, if 
these things are unattainable in this world, and 
we still try to obtain them through the moral 
law, then the conclusion that God wills evil in 
the world is inevitable.  In refuting the 
objection, he claims that “God wills the 
elimination of evil through the all-powerful 
development of the germ toward perfection.  He 
wills that evil be removed through the progress 
toward good.”cxiv  Here, Kant connects the 
purpose of laboring through the moral law and 
God’s holiness.  It is God’s holy and benevolent 
intention that we continually labor ourselves 
toward happiness and goodness through our 
adherence to the moral law.  Since our immoral 
actions are the source of evil, God wills that we 
eliminate our tendencies to disregard the moral 
law through a persistent development of our 
predisposition to the good. 
 In this way, Kant’s notion of happiness 
becomes something contrary to its common 
definition.   For Kant, happiness in this life is 
not mere enjoyment or pleasure.  Instead, “it is 
labor, difficulty, effort, the prospect of 
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tranquility and the striving toward the 
achievement of this idea which is happiness and 
a proof already of God’s benevolence.”cxv  Even 
though evil is in the world, it does not conflict 
with the concept of God as all-good and all-
powerful.  God, who is also all-knowing, wills 
what is best for us, which turns out to be a 
difficult progression toward perfection.  In a 
way, God wills the evil, or “ill,” that goes into 
this progression as “a special arrangement for 
leading the human being toward happiness.”cxvi  
For Kant, this is ultimately a good thing.  
Overcoming ill not only allows humans to get 
closer to the best moral state, but also helps 
them to learn how to get to that state along the 
way.  As Kant puts it, “ill is necessary if the 
human being is to have a wish and an aspiration 
toward a better state, and at the same time to 
learn how to strive to become worthy of it.”cxvii 
 While Kant’s theodicy may be a genuine 
attempt to reconcile evil with a benevolent God, 
it is inconsistent with the rest of his philosophy.  
Throughout Kant’s theodicy in the “Lectures on 
the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion,” Kant 
seems to blur his distinction between theoretical 
and practical reason.  In the first Critique, Kant 
defines theoretical knowledge as “speculative if 
it concerns an object, or those concepts of an 
object, which cannot be reached in any 
experience.”cxviii  Claims concerning God are 
speculative, since God is beyond our 
experience.  Of course, Kant maintains that, in 
his lectures, he’s basing all of his theology on 
practical reason, which allows him to talk of 
God strictly in terms of morality.  Practical 
reason is concerned with “what ought to be” the 
case as opposed to theoretical reason’s enquiry 
into “what is” the case.cxix 
With these definitions, I question 
whether Kant is relying solely on practical 
reason in his theodicy.  Indeed, this solution 
seems to be quite theoretical.  Granted, Kant is 
discussing the centrality of the practical in 
human beings, but he’s also discussing “what is 
the case” for God by reconciling all of the 
traditional attributes of God with evil in the 
world.  In fact, it seems that the very nature of 
most traditional theodicies is theoretical.  These 
theodicies defend and clarify aspects of the 
concept of the greatest Object.  That is to say, 
they attempt to justify our epistemic and 
ontological claims concerning God by securing 
His attribute of being all-good.  In a successful 
theodicy, we can know that God is all-good and 
He exists, which is what Kant is trying to 
accomplish.  This creates a strong tension 
between speculative and practical reason.  It 
thus brings up the question of whether Kant is 
justified in supplying such a traditional 
theodicy.  Again, I acknowledge that he claims 
to be using practical reason through all of this, 
but he seems to blend practical reason with 
elements of theoretical and speculative reason. 
By 1791, Kant appears to have 
acknowledged this tension in his theodicy in his 
essay entitled “On the Miscarriage of All 
Philosophical Trials in Theodicy.”  In this work, 
Kant explains how every theodicy of the past 
has failed, including his own formulation.  He 
recapitulates his old argument by stating that 
“an arduous and sorrowful state in the present 
life must without exception precede that hoped-
for superabundant blessedness—a state in which 
we are to become worthy of that future glory 
precisely through our struggles with 
adversities.”cxx  This is no longer satisfying for 
Kant.  He seems to be a bit more skeptical of the 
“soul-making” claim’s value as a theodicy.  He 
objects that this “soul-making” claim “can 
indeed be pretended but in no way can there be 
insight into it.”cxxi  I think this is Kant’s way of 
conceding that a theodicy of this sort cannot be 
given exclusively via practical reason. Kant 
revokes his theodicy along with the other 
theodicies of the past by claiming that, since 
they are not wholly practical, they fail.  As an 
alternative, Kant offers that “the demonstration 
of [moral wisdom] must be carried out totally a 
priori, hence in no way be founded on the 
experience of what goes on in the world.”cxxii  In 
other words, God is good based on our wholly a 
priori practical deductions from the moral law, 
which prevail regardless of any a posteriori evil 
in the world. 
Recently, the pre-1791 Kantian defense 
of God’s goodness has been revived in John 
Hick’s “soul-making” theodicy.  According to 
Hick, human souls are subjected to the evils in 
this world in order to become more adequate for 
a union with God.  Like Kant, Hick thinks that 
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the endurance of moral beings through evil 
“represents the perfecting of man, the 
fulfillment of God’s purpose for humanity.”cxxiii  
God is justified in retaining a world with so 
much evil because it allows for the growth of an 
individual’s soul into something that is 
simultaneously glorifying to God and 
appropriate for a union with Him.  Kant makes a 
similar claim when he says that ill is in the 
world so that humans can progress toward a sort 
of worthiness to be happy.  As Hick puts it, the 
world must be viewed “as an environment in 
which moral beings may be fashioned, through 
their own free insights and responses, into 
children of God.”cxxiv  Kant claims that humans 
need ill to endure toward happiness through the 
moral law, but this tranquility is unattainable in 
the world.  This seems to imply that a universal 
and perfect adherence to the moral law is simply 
not possible.  Similarly, Hick claims that there is 
no correlation between the moral journey of an 
individual and a “progressive improvement in 
the moral state of the world.”cxxv 
Even if we pardon the blur between 
speculative and practical reason in Kant’s 
formulation, we can still identify problems with 
the general “soul-making” theodicy.  First, there 
are countless situations throughout history 
which seem to reflect genuinely unjustifiable 
suffering even from Hick’s perspective.  The 
Holocaust is the most obvious case.  Why was 
such catastrophic suffering arbitrarily placed on 
a group of people?  Surely their souls could 
have been developed under less suffering.  In 
contrast, there are large groups of immoral 
people who pass through life seemingly 
unscathed by suffering.  If God uses evil to 
make souls better, why is the playing field not 
level?  If there are these immoral people who 
pass through their lives with very little 
suffering, how are continents of starving 
children justified?  This imbalance creates a 
tension in the conception of evil as something 
individuals work through for happiness or 
spiritual growth.  Indeed, one could argue that 
God could have made a more adequate and less 
extreme environment for moral and spiritual 
development. 
An analysis of Kant’s morally-focused 
theodicy reflects its importance in the 
philosophy of religion.  In his lectures, he 
establishes that God wills that we endure and 
eliminate evil through a progression toward a 
perfect adherence to the moral law.  Due to the 
apparent blur between theoretical and practical 
reason as well as other difficulties in his 
theodicy, Kant revokes this in his 1791 essay by 
claiming that the only real theodicy can be 
accomplished a priori through practical reason.  
With John Hick’s adaptation of Kant’s older 
argument, the “soul-making” theodicy appears 
to be clearer and more convincing.  Ultimately, 
however, the argument is riddled with problems 
regardless of whether it is taken in the context 
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